The concept of the “good life” in Japanese society often revolves around family. However, cultural anthropologist Anne Allison (2015) describes that as marriage rates decrease and fewer people have their own family, or maintain steady employment, an increasing number of people feel disconnected from the social attachments that once provided status and “a sense of belonging.” Allison (2015) illustrates that the vision of a good life in Japan has traditionally centered on family, where getting married and having one’s own family confers social status and a sense of connection to society. The author observes that in postwar Japan, during a period of significant economic growth, a mass consumerism, and global recognition as a postindustrial power, men dedicated long hours to work and brought home the paycheck, while women, in turn, managed the household and cared for children, supporting their high academic achievements. A heteronormative and increasingly nuclearized family was largely seen as ideal: men as providers for family, women as caregivers and homemakers, and children as academic achievers who would eventually have their own families and careers. This ideal family model seemed achievable, as the future appeared promising; companies were expected to care for their workers for a lifetime under the “Japanese management style,” enabling men–mainly known as sararimen or salaried men––to secure steady jobs and incomes to support their families (Allison, 2015). Although the number of women entering the labor market after leaving school increased over time, many women typically left the workforce once they got married and had children (Ogasawara, 1998, p. 18). It was also common for women to work in part-time, particularly after resuming work following childbirth or marriage, suggesting that the gendered division of labor remained strong (Allison, 2015).

          However, after the bubble burst in the 1990s, this long-term employment model disintegrated under the neoliberal reforms implemented by the Japanese government, which replaced the job-for-life model with a more flexible and results-based approach, leading to a growing sense of job insecurity (Allison, 2015, p. 42). Moreover, layoffs and unemployment rose, along with a rapid increase in the number of irregular employees. Youth, women, those with less impressive academic qualifications, foreign migrants, and men in their fifties were the primary targets of this trend (p. 43). Driven by economic downturn and job uncertainty, having a family became increasingly risky, and overall social trends began to shift away from marriage and family, particularly among those in the least secure jobs. Durable attachments to both jobs and families have become increasingly difficult to achieve, turning what was once viewed as an ordinary lifestyle or a “good life” into a privilege for a diminishing minority. Many individuals lost the comfort of “being somewhere” and being normal. This social stress was marked by an increasing number of individuals living on their own, evidenced by a shrinking population due to low birth rates and a decline in the number of people choosing to marry or start families. Consequently, many began to feel isolated from others and society, which is linked to various issues, including high rates of suicide, social withdrawal, directionless youth, homelessness, and underemployment. This state of social life, or lonely death, was also highlighted in a 2010 Japanese TV program by the public broadcaster NHK, which used the phrase “muenshakai” (無縁社会) or reactionless society (Allison, 2015). Overall, these social dynamics following the bubble burst have led to a growing number of people feeling insecure about jobs and the future, as well as a reluctance to marry or start families, resulting in a declining sense of social belonging.

          This narrative of Japan’s inevitable decline continues to be prominent, which is reflected in the year-by-year increase in the unmarried rate and the persistently low birth rate (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, n.d.; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2023). Today, even though people’s perspectives on family have evolved over the years and fewer may also feel that it necessarily correlates with social status and a sense of belonging, Allison (2015) notes that a certain notion of family and home still symbolizes social well-being, similar to its importance during Japan’s economic growth. This indicates that when the family is at risk, social life in Japan itself is also at risk. As Allison (2015) argues, if the social script has been too narrowly defined by family–-especially an aspirational and exclusionary notion of family–-then new social designs for being, belonging, and supporting one another beyond the traditional context are needed to reclaim hope of precarity (p. 51).

          Moreover, even the workplace can no longer serve as a space where individuals feel belonginess. The “Japanese management style,” along with long-term employment and job security during the pre-bubble burst period, enhanced a sense of belonging and commitment to the company among salarymen. Companies functioned almost like an extended family, where work relations were family-like, making jobs an integral part of individual identity. However, after the bubble burst, as a result of the collapse of the job-for-life model and its replacement with a more flexible, results-based approach, a sense of belonging––or a sense of “family” ––within the company was lost, detaching salarymen from the familial atmosphere of the workplace (Allison, 2015). Thus, the erosion of this sense of commitment to the workplace after the bubble burst has contributed to a wider sense of social disbelonging particularly among those salarymen, diminishing opportunities for individuals today to experience a meaningful sense of belonging in their professional lives.

          This shift means that not only is it increasingly difficult to form a family in this precarious social structure, but the workplace is also no longer likely to be a place where workers can feel they belong. Deprived of affiliation with the workplace and the means to marry and have a family––traditional markers of adulthood and the “good life” ––individuals have become socially vulnerable, contributing to a weakening sense of social belonging. Those most affected are the underemployed, without a human safety net, and socially alone (Allison, 2015). In this context, it is crucial to create alternative spaces for fostering a sense of belonging beyond traditional institutions such as family and the workplace.

          Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic further contributed to a decline in individuals’ participation in social networks and organization and accelerated the erosion of their sense of belonging. The pandemic, which began in early 2020, resulted in the adoption of unprecedented “social distancing” strategies that were crucial in limiting the spread of the virus. Initiatives such as the transition to remote work and schooling, along with limited human interactions, have contributed to a loss of social connection and a widespread sense of loneliness among individuals. A survey conducted by the Japan Science and Technology Agency and Waseda university in 2022 shows that feelings of loneliness in Japanese society have not decreased dramatically since the pandemic in 2020. Even though many social activities have returned to pre-pandemic level, nearly 40% of people in Japan still report feeling lonely, with the highest rates observed among individuals in their 20s, followed by those in their 30s (JST, 2022).

          Amidst social detachment from family and workplace, coupled with the social isolation marked by COVID-19, loneliness, diminished connectedness, and a weakened sense of belonging have come to characterize the current social context in Japan. Previous studies suggest that such social relationships impact multiple interconnected health outcomes, including health behaviors, mental well-being, and the risk of mortality (Umberson & Montez, 2010). Crisp (2010) observes that most people have an inherent need to feel a sense of belonging, which they experience to varying degrees across different relationships, environments, and social settings (p. 124). Similarly, Oldenburg (1989) argues that maintaining connections with people can make all the difference, providing a balance between relative tranquility and confronting the demons of isolation (p. 50). This underscores the crucial need for alternative spaces where individuals can foster connectedness and a sense of belonging, beyond traditional institutions such as family and the workplace. The next chapter will explore theoretical frameworks and how these frameworks align with the objectives of the sento environments under study in promoting individuals’ connectedness and fostering a sense of belonging.